Research

Working Papers

The Spirit of Vienna: Why Negotiations Succeed While Key Provisions Falter (Paper available upon request)

International agreements targeting transnational organized crime, such as the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the United Nations Firearms Protocol, initially excluded any mention of monitoring mechanisms despite strong calls by delegates and practitioners, only to establish a new mechanism eighteen years later. What explains the exclusion of crucial provisions in international agreements and their eventual inclusion over time? In this paper, I theorize that procedural legitimacy–the norm shaping delegates’ perceptions of the “rightful” processes of decision-making–actively molds state preferences and rational solutions during treaty negotiations. I argue that venue-specific norms of procedural legitimacy, such as the “Vienna Spirit,” initially prevented the inclusion of monitoring mechanisms in the UNTOC and the Firearms Protocol. Delegates navigated around the “Vienna Spirit,” ultimately allowing monitoring mechanisms to be instituted over time. As a theory-generating case study, I compare and trace treaty negotiations of the UNTOC and the UN Firearms Protocol, from the initial negotiations in 2001 until 2018, when a monitoring mechanism was finally established. I draw on six months of fieldwork at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, as well as archival research and thirty-eight interviews with direct participants. The analysis underscores the pivotal role of mid-level diplomats and the norms of procedural legitimacy in shaping global cooperation.

Arbitrators as Advisors: Evidence from Changes in Investment Treaty Design
Co-authored with Minju Kim (Paper available upon request)

The international investment regime is increasingly reliant on the expertise of lawyers. What impact does the rise of lawyers have on the design of international cooperation? We argue that lawyers can advise states to create investment treaties that lower institutional barriers, making it easier for investors to access legal dispute resolution. Using an original dataset of 479 arbitration practitioners registered with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes from 1974 to 2023, along with a newly constructed dataset measuring investors’ access to legal dispute settlement, we find that states with a larger pool of arbitration practitioners are more likely to amend their treaties in a way that eases investors’ access to Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). We also find support for our theory through interviews with arbitration practitioners. The growing reliance on lawyers can reshape and professionalize international cooperation beyond the purview of states.

Evolution or Devolution? A New Dataset on the Design of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements
Co-authored with Saera Lee (Under Review Paper available upon request)

Drivers of nuclear proliferation have shifted over time. Yet, it remains unclear whether the designs of agreements targeting nuclear proliferation and disarmament have evolved alongside these shifts, or merely replicate earlier models. To address this question, we build on insights from institutional design research and arms control scholarship to introduce the Non-proliferation Legal Index (NPLI) dataset. This dataset covers 89 agreements negotiated or concluded through 2025, incorporating guidance from an anonymous International Atomic Energy Agency professional with over 30 years of experience. It expands beyond standard measures of obligation, precision, and delegation by coding detailed provisions targeting each stage of nuclear proliferation. We further demonstrate how large language models, specifically Chat GPT, can be employed to efficiently code complex legal texts. Preliminary analysis of the NPLI dataset offers new evidence on whether recent agreements incorporate updated provisions aligned with evolving proliferation drivers or simply echo established templates. These findings have significant implications for understanding whether the current regime complex is equipped to deal with the drivers of nuclear non-proliferation, and also contributes through highlighting innovating ways to code legal text.

Leaving the Door Open: ICC Withdrawal and the Curious Norm Compliance Co-authored with Sumin Lee (Paper available upon request)

International human rights treaties are created to uphold human rights norms and to improve domestic practices. Increasingly, states are withdrawing from international agreements. If states decide to withdraw from a human rights treaty, does this lead to a decline in domestic human rights practices that the international treaty was meant to promote? Focusing on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, this paper examines the domestic impact of the Statute withdrawal. We propose a theory of performative compliance to explain how states that do not have intention to comply with human rights norms – such as through withdrawing from the treaty – perform compliance to evade backlash and resistance. We test the argument through the case of Burundi, one of the two countries that withdrew from the Rome Statute. Through process-tracing and text analysis of the government statements, we find that the Burundi government attempted performative compliance post-withdrawal to avoid further responsibility and condemnations from human rights advocates. The research implies that withdrawal may not lead to a direct decline in goals of international treaties, and that states may still be bound to these standards even after withdrawal at least under international scrutiny.